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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Effects of Inconsistencies in Eyewitness Testimony
on Mock-Juror Decisionmaking
by
Garrett L. Berman
Florida International University, 1995
Professor Brian L. Cutler, Major Professor
In attempting to impeach eyewitnesses, attorney's often
highlight inconsistencies in the eyewitness's recall. This
study examined the differential impact of types of
inconsistent testimony on mock-juror decisions. Each of 100
community members and 200 undergraduates viewed one of four
versions of a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence
against the defendant was the testimony of the eyewitness.
I manipulated the types of inconsistent statements given by
the eyewitness in the four versions: (1) consistent
testimony, (2) information given on-the-stand but not given
during the pre-trial investigation, (3) contradictions
between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements, and (4)
contradictions made on the witness stand. Subjects exposed
to any form of inconsistent testimony were less likely to
convict and found the defendant less culpable and the
eyewitness less effective. These effects were larger for
contradictions than for information given on the stand but
not during pre-trial investigations.
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Introduction
False eyewitness identifications occur frequently in
laboratory and field studies (Cutler & Penrod, 1995) and
appear to be one of the leading cause of erroneous
conviction (Borchard, 1932; Brandon & Davies, 1973; Frank &
Frank, 1957; Rattner, 1988). The legal safeguards designed
to protect defendants from erroneous conviction resulting
from mistaken identification include the presence of counsel
at lineups (U.S. v. Wade, 1967), expert psychological
testimony about human memory (People v. McDonald, 1984), and
judges' instructions concerning how to evaluate eyewitness
identification (U.S. v. Telfaire, 1972). The effectiveness
of these safeguards is questionable. Attorneys are rarely
present at their clients' lineups and, even if present,
appear insensitive to some factors that influence lineup
suggestiveness (Stinson, Devenport, Cutler, & Kravitz,
1995). Expert psychological testimony on eyewitness memory
is usually not admitted in court (Cutler & Penrod, 1995;
Walters, 1985). Judges' instructions on eyewitness
identifications are used sporadically (Walters, 1985) and
appear to not improve the quality of jurors' decisions
(Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, 1991; Greene, 1988).
Cross-examination is the most commonly used safeguard,
and it is widely believed to provide defendants with
sufficient protection from erroneous conviction (Walters,
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1985). Indeed, cross-examination is believed to be so
effective that it is often cited as the primary reason for
not invoking other safeguards, such as motions to suppress
biased lineups and expert psychological testimony (Cutler &
Penrod, 1995; Walters, 1985). How effective is cross-
examination as a safeguard?
In order to address this question, we must first
consider how attorneys cross-examine eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, we know of no study of actual cross-
examinations of eyewitnesses and only one related study of
how attorneys divide their time. A job-analysis of public
defenders in South Florida (Prager, Moran, & Sanchez, 1992)
revealed that identifying and eliciting inconsistencies in
eyewitness testimony is a routine and important part of
trial preparation. This finding coincides with advice
typically found in trial practice manuals (e.g., Bailey &
Rothblatt, 1985), suggesting that, during cross-examination,
attorneys should focus upon inconsistencies in the
eyewitness's testimony and encourage the jury to cast doubt
on the identification in light of those inconsistencies.
Thus, there is some reason to believe that eliciting
inconsistencies in eyewitness testimony represents a common
cross-examination strategy among defense attorneys. How
effective is this strategy? What do we know about the
impact of testimonial inconsistencies on juror
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decisionmaking? This research focuses on these questions
and, in so doing, attempts to bring data to bear on the
effectiveness of cross-examination in cases involving
eyewitness identification.
Using trial simulation methodology, three empirical
studies have examined the effects of eyewitness
inconsistency on jurors decisionmaking (Berman, Narby &
Cutler, 1995; Leippe & Romanczyk, 1989; Lindsay, Lim,
Marando, & Cully, 1986). In each study the eyewitness
testified on behalf of the prosecution, so inconsistencies
in the eyewitness testimony should be associated with pro-
defense decisions.
Lindsay et al. (1986) investigated the impact of a
series of contradictory statements about the criminal's hair
color on mock-juror decisions. In the contradictory
testimony condition the eyewitness testified that she
originally stated that the criminal had blond hair, did not
think the defendant (whom she identified from a lineup)
could be described as blond, did not know if the defendant
altered her hair color between the crime and lineup,
recalled the defendant's hair as dark at the time of the
lineup, and was certain of her identification. These
statements were not given in the control condition. After
listening to the audiotaped simulated trial, subjects rated
the consistency of the eyewitness testimony and the guilt of
3
the defendant. Contradictory statements provided by the
eyewitness did not influence subjects' verdicts.
Using a written trial summary, Leippe and Romanczyk
(1989) examined how subjects' decisions were influenced by
inconsistent statements provided by an adult or child
eyewitness. In the inconsistent testimony condition
subjects were exposed to a series of statements, some of
which were highlighted as contradictions between on-the-
stand testimony and pre-trial statements. Also included in
this condition were statements made on the stand but not in
pre-trial interviews. Other subjects were exposed to no
inconsistent statements. Inconsistency of testimony did not
significantly impact subjects' verdicts but the inconsistent
child witness was seen as less credible than the consistent
child witness.
Berman et al. (1995) further examined the impact of
inconsistent testimony using a videotaped simulated cross-
examination. They manipulated the number and type (central
versus peripheral) of descriptive dimensions on which the
eyewitness provided contradictory testimony. All
contradictions were between on-the-stand and pre-trial
statements. Subjects exposed to inconsistent eyewitness
testimony perceived the eyewitness as less credible, the
defendant as less culpable, and convicted the defendant less
4
often. Inconsistencies in peripheral and central details
produced effects of comparable magnitudes.
In conclusion, results of the three studies are mixed.
The many differences between these studies makes explaining
the disparate results difficult. Particularly noteworthy is
the different ways in which inconsistency was
operationalized. Lindsay et al. (1986) examined the
influence of contradictions between an eyewitness's original
description of a perpetrator (conveyed on the witness stand)
and the characteristics of the person identified. Leippe
and Romanczyk (1989) examined the impact of a composite
manipulation consisting of two types of inconsistencies:
contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial statements
and statements given on the witness stand but not in pre-
trial interviews. Berman et al. (1995) assessed the impact
of contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial
statements.
It seems plausible that the impact of inconsistent
testimony would vary as a function of the nature of the
inconsistency, as some inconsistencies may be easier to
excuse than others. There is little directly relevant
social-cognitive theory upon which to draw when
hypothesizing how type of inconsistency might influence
juror decisionmaking. Nevertheless, we know these types of
inconsistencies appear in trials (though their frequencies
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are not obvious or demonstrated empirically). My strategy
is to assess whether type of inconsistency matters, and, if
so, explain any differences through further experimentation.
This study tests my intuitive hypothesis that the highest
conviction-rate and highest ratings of defendant culpability
and eyewitness effectiveness would be given by subjects
exposed to (1) consistent testimony. These scores would be
significantly lower for subjects exposed to (2) statements
given on the witness stand that were not given during pre-
trial investigation, significantly lower still for subjects
exposed to (3) contradictions between statements given on
the witness stand and during pre-trial investigation, and
significantly lower (lowest) for (4) subjects exposed to
contradictions made on the witness stand.
One might reasonably ask why I am pursuing this issue
given the lack of theoretical guidance from the
psychological literature. One common approach to
psycholegal scholarship is to test the relevance of
psychological theories for legal proceedings. For example,
Kassin (1985) examined the implications of social awareness
theory for improving the association between eyewitness
confidence and identification accuracy. Yet another
approach is to identify important phenomena that have
implications for both the legal system and psychology, and
then later bring existing or new psychological theory to
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bear on the issue. For example, Malpass and Kravitz (1969)
discovered the own-race bias in face recognition, that is,
people are more accurate at recognizing faces of their own
race than of other races. Research for the past two decades
has (unsuccessfully) attempted to use psychological theory
to explain this phenomenon. The present research is more
consistent with the approach taken by Malpass and Kravitz
(1969). Other approaches to psycholegal research exist as
well, and the growing knowledge base will benefit from the
variety of research strategies.
Last, the three previous studies relied exclusively on
college undergraduates as subjects. Some (e.g., Konecni &
Ebbesen, 1979; Weiten & Diamond, 1979) have questioned the
external validity of trial simulation research that relies
exclusively on college students as subjects. This study
used both college students and jury-eligible community
members. Use of both samples permits an empirical test of
external validity: are college students and community
members differentially affected by inconsistent testimony,
or do the results from college students generalize to
community members? Several previous trial simulation
studies that have explicitly compared these samples found no
significant differences in their patterns of decisions
(Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, 1989; Cutler, Penrod & Dexter,
1990; Platania, 1995).
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Method
Subjects
The sample consisted of 300 subjects, 200 of whom were
students from introductory psychology classes at a
southeastern regional state university. Students received
course credit for their participation. The remaining 100
subjects were jury-eligible community members from the same
region. Community members were selected from a variety of
organizations (e.g., Jewish Community Center, Veterans
Association, Elk's Lodge). In exchange for member
participation the organizations were paid $3 per
participant. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of
the four experimental conditions (50 students and 25
community members per condition).
Procedure
Subjects were tested in groups ranging in size from
three to nine people. Upon arrival, subjects were
instructed that they would be viewing a videotaped trial and
to pay close attention because they would be responding to
the case as if they were jurors. After viewing the
videotape, subjects responded to questionnaires containing
the dependent measures.
Stimulus Materials
The videotaped trial lasted approximately 35 minutes.
The trial was based on Berman et al.'s (1995) materials but
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was elaborated upon to include opening statements, other
witnesses, closing arguments, and judges' instructions (see
Appendix for trial script). Opening statements and closing
arguments were similar in length and were prepared with the
help of local defense attorneys. The judges' instructions
were taken verbatim from the state's standard jury
instructions. The defendant was charged with robbery, and
the primary evidence against him was the testimony of the
eyewitness who identified him as the perpetrator.
Law students from a local university played the roles
of attorneys and judge. Student assistants played the roles
of the witnesses. Four versions of the videotaped trial
were created. The differences between the versions were
limited to cross-examination of the eyewitness, and the
manipulations always involved four questions about the same
details of the crime. The four versions of the videotape
were created by editing from a single master tape, so that
each version was identical with the exception of the
manipulation.
In the control, or consistent, condition, the
eyewitness provided no inconsistent statements. In the
remaining three conditions the eyewitness provided
inconsistent statements in response to four questions in the
following order for all conditions: whether the perpetrator
appeared to be nervous or calm during the incident, whether
9
the perpetrator threatened the eyewitness if she didn't
cooperate, where the perpetrator placed the stolen money
(inside his jacket pocket v. canvas bag), and whether the
perpetrator was wearing any jewelry (gold chain v. no gold
chain). Immediately after inconsistent testimony was given
in response to one of the questions, the defense attorney
confronted the eyewitness with her current and previous
statements and asked which response was accurate. The
eyewitness always responded with the most recent answer.
In the novel information condition, subjects were
exposed to eyewitness statements highlighted by the defense
attorney because they were not previously mentioned by the
eyewitness during the investigation. For example, after
being asked whether or not the defendant was wearing any
jewelry, the eyewitness stated "yes, he was wearing a gold
chain." The defense attorney responded: "how come you never
mentioned any jewelry in previous depositions?" The
eyewitness then responded with the recently stated
information (e.g, "I remember he was wearing a chain").
In the on-the-stand/pre-trial contradiction condition,
the responses of the eyewitness were highlighted by the
attorney as inconsistent with previous statements provided
by the eyewitness at some point during the investigation
(e.g., police reports, depositions). For example, after
being asked whether or not the defendant was wearing any
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jewelry, the eyewitness stated that "she remembered the
defendant wearing a gold chain." The defense attorney
responded: "in a previous deposition you stated the
perpetrator was not wearing any jewelry, which is it?" The
eyewitness always claimed that her present testimony was
accurate (e.g, "I remember he was wearing a chain").
In the on-the-stand contradiction condition, the
responses of the eyewitness were highlighted by the attorney
because the eyewitness contradicted herself during the
cross-examination. For example, the eyewitness stated early
in her testimony that the perpetrator was not wearing any
jewelry. Upon further questioning, the eyewitness stated
that the perpetrator was wearing a gold chain. The defense
attorney responded by stating to the eyewitness "you stated
earlier in your testimony that the perpetrator was not
wearing any jewelry, which is it?" The eyewitness then
responded with the more recently stated information (e.g, "I
remember he was wearing a chain"). The on-the-stand
contradiction condition was the only manipulation in which
subjects heard both contradictions spoken by the eyewitness.
Dependant Measures
The questionnaire included a dichotomous verdict (not
guilty v. guilty) and a series of rating scales. Three
items were designed to assess defendant culpability:
probability that the defendant committed the crime (0 = low
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probability; 6 = high probability) and strength of the
prosecution's and defense's cases (0 = very weak; 6 = very
strong). Eight items were designed to assess effectiveness
of the eyewitness: credibility, consistency, confidence,
accuracy, likability, honesty, appearance of confusion, and
trustworthiness of the eyewitness. Responses to these items
were recorded on scales ranging from 0 (not very [credible,
trustworthy, etc.]) to 6 (very [credible, trustworthy,
etc.]). Subjects also responded to questions about prior
experience as a crime victim and juror and other
miscellaneous characteristics and reactions to the trial.
Results
Standardized effect-sizes for all comparisons are
displayed in Table 1 (see pp. 29).
Verdict
Overall conviction rate was 37% across conditions. A 2
(Subject Type) X 4 (Inconsistency Condition) log-linear
analysis of verdict revealed that community members
convicted the defendant at a significantly higher rate than
did college students (46% v. 32%, x2 (1, N = 300) = 6.76, p <
.01. The main effect for inconsistency condition was also
significant x2(3, N = 300) = 53.81, p < .001. The
conviction-rates were 69% for the consistent condition, 37%
for the novel information condition, and 20% for the on-the-
stand and on-the-stand/pre-trial contradiction conditions.
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Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons using an alpha level of .05
revealed that conviction-rates in all three inconsistency
conditions differed significantly from the consistent
condition. Contrary to my hypothesis, conviction-rate did
not differ between the on-the-stand and on-the-stand/pre-
trial contradiction conditions. The difference in
conviction-rate between the novel information condition and
the contradictory conditions was in the expected direction
and appreciable in magnitude but statistically non-
significant. The Subject Type X Inconsistency Condition
interaction was non-significant x2(3, N = 300) = 1.37, p >
.05, indicating that college students' and jury eligible
community members verdicts were comparably influenced by
inconsistent testimony.
Defendant Culpability
Means for individual items were 3.20 for probability
that the defendant committed the crime, 3.02 for strength of
the prosecution's case, and 3.08 for strength of defense
case. The three items assessing defendant culpability were
highly intercorrelated (Coefficient Alpha = .80; corrected
item-total correlations ranged from .52 to .72). Given the
high level of internal consistency, I recoded the one
negatively keyed item and averaged responses to the three
items to form a scale labelled defendant culpability. A
higher score indicates greater defendant culpability.
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A 2 (Subject-Type) X 4 (Inconsistency Condition) ANOVA
on defendant culpability produced a significant main effect
for subject-type F (1,292) = 5.17, p < .05. Community
members found the defendant more culpable (m = 3.29) than
did the student sample (m = 2.92).
The main effect for inconsistency was also significant,
E (3,292) = 15.60, p < .001. Defendant culpability was
perceived as highest in the consistent condition (m = 3.83),
significantly lower in the novel information condition (m =
3.22), and significantly lower still in the on-the-
stand/pre-trial (m = 2.58) and on-the-stand (m = 2.56)
contradiction conditions, with the latter two means not
differing significantly from one another. These conclusions
were based on Bonferroni post-hoc analyses with an alpha
level of .05. The Subject-Type X Inconsistency Condition
interaction was non-significant, F (3,292) = .935, p > .05,
indicating that students' and jury eligible community
members' culpability ratings were comparably influenced by
inconsistent testimony.
Effectiveness of the Eyewitness
Means for the eight items assessing effectiveness of
the eyewitness ranged from 2.59 (perceived eyewitness
consistency) to 4.06 (perceived eyewitness confidence).
These items were found to be internally consistent
(Coefficient Alpha = .92; corrected item-total correlations
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ranged from .57 to .85); consequently, I recoded negatively
keyed items and averaged responses to the eight items to
form a single scale titled eyewitness effectiveness. A
higher score indicates greater perceived effectiveness.
A 2 (Subject-Type) X 4 (Inconsistent Condition) ANOVA
on eyewitness effectiveness produced a significant main
effect for subject type, E (1,292) = 6.01, p < .05.
Community members rated the eyewitness as more effective (m
= 3.62) than did the student sample (m = 3.25).
The main effect for inconsistency condition was also
significant, F (3,292) = 26.89 p < .001. Bonferroni post-
hoc analyses with an alpha level of .05 revealed that the
eyewitness was seen as most effective in the consistent
condition (m = 4.34), significantly less effective in the
novel information condition (m = 3.55), and significantly
less effective still in the on-the-stand/pre-trial (m =
2.91) and on-the-stand (m = 2.71) contradiction conditions,
with the latter two means not differing significantly from
one another. The Subject Type X Inconsistency Condition
interaction was non-significant, F (3,292) = 1.45, showing
that students' and community members' eyewitness
effectiveness ratings were comparably influenced by
inconsistency condition.
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Prior Jury Experience
Community members were significantly more likely to
have served on juries than were students (29% v. 7%), x 2 (1,
N=300) = 27.43, p < .001. Subjects who served on juries, as
compared to those with no prior jury service, were more
likely to convict (52% v. 35% X2 (1, N = 300) = 4.94, p <
.05), perceived the defendant as more culpable (3.62 v.
2.96, F (1,295) = 7.83, p < .01) and regarded the eyewitness
as more effective (3.84 v. 3.31, F (1,295) = 5.34, p < .05).
This pattern of findings suggests the possibility that
the main effects observed for subject type could have been a
function of prior jury service. In order to test this
possibility, verdict, defendant culpability and eyewitness
effectiveness were regressed separately over prior jury
service (Step 1) and subject type (Step 2). In each of the
three analyses, when the variance in the dependent variable
associated with prior jury service was extracted, subject
type was no longer a significant predictor (partial r = .10
for verdict, .08 for defendant culpability, and .09 for
eyewitness effectiveness, p > .05 for each). This suggests
that prior jury service might explain the main effects for
subject type.
Discussion
Community members consistently reached more pro-
prosecution decisions as compared to students. When prior
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jury service, which was also associated with pro-prosecution
decisions, was controlled for, the main effects for subject
type became non-significant. The interaction between
subject type and inconsistency condition was non-significant
in all tests, implying that community members and students
were comparably influenced by inconsistent testimony. The
lack of floor and ceiling effects further supports our
interpretation of the non-significant interactions. These
findings are consistent with the results of post-trial
interviews (Broeder; 1965), archival analyses (Dillehay &
Nietzel, 1985; Werner, Strube, Cole, & Kagehiro, 1985) and
survey research (Reed; 1965) showing that prior jury
experience is associated with pro-prosecution attitudes and
with studies showing that community members and students are
comparably influenced by variations in eyewitness testimony
(Cutler et al., 1989, 1990) and other trial manipulations
(Platania, 1995).
Subjects exposed to any form of inconsistency, as
compared to those exposed to consistent testimony, were
significantly less likely to convict and perceived the
defendant as less culpable and the eyewitness as less
effective. As predicted, contradictions, whether between
on-the-stand statements or between on-the-stand and pre-
trial statements, had a greater effect than did information
provided on the stand but not in pre-trial investigations.
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These differences were significant in tests of defendant
culpability and eyewitness effectiveness. The difference
was non-significant but appreciable in magnitude and in the
expected direction for verdict -- a dichotomous and
therefore less statistically sensitive dependent measure.
Results of this study compliment the earlier results of
Berman et al. (1995), who studied the impact of
contradictions between on-the-stand and pre-trial
statements. They also compliment the results of Leippe and
Romanczyk (1989), who found that inconsistent testimony
(consisting of both on-the-stand/pre-trial contradictions
and on-the-stand statements not mentioned in pre-trial
interviews) diminished the credibility of the child
eyewitness. In contrast, Leippe and Romanczyk (1989) found
that the inconsistent testimony did not influence verdict
nor credibility of the adult eyewitness. These results are
difficult to compare to Lindsay et al. (1986), as they
assessed the impact of yet a different kind of
inconsistency, to wit, a contradiction between a description
of the perpetrator and the physical characteristics of the
defendant identified from the lineup.
As mentioned earlier, there is little social-cognitive
psychological theory that directly explain these results.
Given the potential ecological importance of these findings,
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more attention should be paid to theoretical explanations
(assuming, of course, that these findings replicate).
One related phenomenon is the discounting hypothesis
(Kelley, 1972): the presence of other potential causes for a
behavior (referred to as discounting cues) leads observers
to attach less importance to any given cause for that
behavior. Consider, for example, the differences observed
between the novel information and on-the-stand contradiction
conditions. When subjects are presented with statements on
the witness stand that were not given during pretrial
investigation, they may reason that other explanations exist
for the novel information. Many explanations exist, such as
the previous investigator, in the pre-trial interview, did
not inquire about the novel information or asked questions
in such a way as to not elicit certain information. During
pre-trial investigation the eyewitness or the investigator
may not have thought that the information presented later in
court was important enough to mention. These explanations
do not necessarily imply faulty memory and they do not apply
to on-the-stand contradictions. Thus, if we assume these
explanations serve as discounting cues, jurors may be more
willing to excuse inconsistencies of the novel information
sort than of the on-the-stand contradiction sort.
On the other hand, the discounting cues might also
support a significant difference between the on-the-stand
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and on-the-stand/pre-trial contradiction conditions.
Subjects may be more willing to excuse the on-the-stand/pre-
trial contradictions because there was a greater time lag
between them than between on-the-stand contradictions.
Results of the present study do not support this notion.
The discounting explanation assumes that jurors are
sensitive to factors such as time lag between statements and
interview context. This seems unlikely given that jurors
appear insensitive to many cognitive and social
psychological factors that influence other aspects of
eyewitness memory, such as eyewitness identification
(Cutler et al., 1990).
Given the findings of the present and previous studies
(particularly Berman et al., 1995), it is sensible to ask
whether inconsistency is, in fact, indicative of inaccuracy.
Fisher and Cutler (in press) summarized data from four
separate studies examining 612 identification attempts of
eight different targets. Descriptions of the to-be-
identified target persons were obtained on two occasions and
were scored for consistency. Identifications were obtained
from target-present and -absent photoarrays. Thus, each
subject had a score for proportion of consistent statements
and a score for identification accuracy. Correlations were
computed across subjects but separately for each of the
eight targets. These correlations ranged from -. 06 to .23
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and averaged only .10. Only two of the correlations were
statistically significant. In conclusion, the only
npublished data addressing this issue shows that consistency
of testimony is not a powerful predictor of eyewitness
identification accuracy. It is not clear, therefore, that
impeaching eyewitnesses on the basis of inconsistent
statements actually improves the quality of juror decisions.
Eyewitnesses impeached for giving inconsistent testimony may
be no less accurate than eyewitnesses who give consistent
testimony.
Further research is needed to understand the relations
between consistency and accuracy of eyewitness testimony,
how different types of inconsistent statements influence
juror decisionmaking, juror sensitivity to factors affecting
eyewitness testimony, and theoretical underpinnings of these
effects. Of course, it is also important to assess how the
effects of inconsistent testimony might be qualified by
discussion during jury deliberation. In addition, more
research is needed on the frequency with which
inconsistencies of the different types appear in court or in
other significant legal proceedings and the frequency with
which such inconsistencies are exploited. It would also be
interesting to know the techniques that attorneys use during
re-direct examination to rehabilitate eyewitnesses who have
been discredited through inconsistent testimony, the
21
frequency with which these techniques are used, and their
effectiveness. Relatedly, it is critical to assess the
impact of inconsistent statements in more realistic trials.
While use of a videotaped trial may represent some
improvement over written trial materials (e.g., Leippe &
Romanczyk, 1989) or audiotaped trials (e.g., Lindsay et al.,
1986), the gains are modest. Because of length
restrictions, the eyewitness testimony may be overemphasized
and the effects of inconsistent testimony exaggerated.
Field studies involving actual cases would be particularly
useful.
Last, identifying inconsistencies is only one strategy
that attorneys use in cross-examination of eyewitnesses. It
is also reasonable to believe that attorneys focus questions
on the factors affecting the eyewitness's ability to encode
information at the time of the crime and retrieve or
recognize crime details later. Unfortunately, as mentioned
earlier, there is little research on attorneys' actual
practices in cross-examination. Trial simulation studies of
juror sensitivity to encoding and retrieval factors reveal
that even when many such factors are brought to their
attention in cross-examination, subjects tend to ignore them
(Cutler et al., 1990) unless subjects are guided by expert
psychological testimony explaining how these factors
influence eyewitness memory (Cutler et al., 1989).
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Furthermore, there is evidence that attorneys themselves are
not sensitive to some important factors affecting eyewitness
memory (Brigham & Wolfskeil, 1983; Stinson et al., 1995).
Trial simulation studies further show that, when left to
their own devices, subjects base their decisions on factors
that appear to have questionable associations with
identification accuracy, including confidence, level of
detail in testimony, accuracy of peripheral details and
consistency of testimony, (Bell & Loftus, 1989; Cutler et
al., 1990; Fisher & Cutler, in press; Lindsay, Wells, &
O'Connor, 1989; Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells &
Leippe, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979).
Consequently, further research should focus on using
psychological theory to enhance the effectiveness of cross-
examination as a safeguard. Further research should also
examine the impact of other existing safeguards and devise
new, effective safeguards for protecting defendants from
erroneous conviction resulting from mistaken eyewitness
identification.
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Table 1
Standardized Effect-Sizes (d) for Pairwise Comparisons of
Consistency Condition Means
On-The-Stand/
Rating Novel Pre-Trial On-The-Stand
Dimension Information Contradictions Contradictions
Verdict
Consistent
Information .66 1.02 1.02
Novel
Information .35 .35
On-The-Stand/
Pre-trial
Contradictions .00
Defendant
Culpability
Consistent
Information .43 .87 .89
Novel
Information .45 .46
On-The-Stand/
Pre-trial
Contradictions .01
Effectiveness of
the Eyewitness
Consistent
Information .57 1.03 1.18
Novel
Information .46 .61
On-The-Stand/
Pre-trial
Contradictions .15
Note: d = differences between means divided by standard
deviations.
29
Appendix
OPENING STATEMENT FOR PROSECUTION
May it please the court. Today, ladies and gentlemen,
we are here for one reason and one reason only, on Friday at
approximately 9 in the morning, Mr. Jones, armed with a gun,
robbed the Glendale Federal Bank in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida.
Good morning ladies and gentlemen, my name is Mrs. Waters
and I work as a prosecutor for the Broward County State
Attorneys' Office. The evidence will show and we will prove
beyond a reasonable doubt through eyewitness testimony that
Mr. Jones committed this heinous crime. Now, although we
the state have the burden of proof in this case, we are very
confident that you will render the only verdict that speaks
the truth, a verdict of guilty of armed robbery.
OPENING STATEMENT FOR DEFENSE
Mistaken identity. Let me say that again. Mistaken
identity! Hello, ladies and gentlemen, my name is Mrs.
Daley and I represent Mr. Jones in this case. When I first
stood before you, I said the phrase Mistaken Identity. This
case involves the concept of mistaken identity and how
someone can think they see something when they actually do
not. The evidence in the case will show that Mr. Jones was
not in the bank at the time of the robbery. Moreover, the
defense will show that Mr. Jones was not the man who robbed
the bank. Now ladies and gentlemen, we agree with the state
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that this was a heinous crime and someone should be
punished. But, ladies and gentlemen, that someone is not
Mr. Jones. Keep in mind throughout this trial that the
state bears the burden of proof. They must prove beyond and
to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones
committed this crime. I am confident that after you listen
to all the testimony and take into consideration all the
evidence, you will find Mr. Jones not guilty of armed
robbery.
Direct Examination of Dawn Mitchell (the Eyewitness)
JUDGE: Today we are hearing evidence in the case of the
State of Florida v. Gary Jones. The defendant, Mr. Jones is
accused of robbery. Mrs. Waters (prosecuting attorney)
would you like to call your first witness?
A. Yes, your honor, the State would like to
call Dawn Mitchell to the stand.
Q. Dawn, my name is Mrs. Waters and, I'm the
prosecuting attorney. There's some questions that I
want to ask you concerning the robbery at your bank.
If there is any time during questioning you become
confused, please inform me. I'm here to find out what
the truth is. If you don't know something I want you
to answer that you don't know, or you are not sure. If
you are sure, then you answer it that way.
A. Okay.
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Q. Would you state you full name, please?
A. Dawn Leeann Mitchell.
Q. Dawn, where do you work?
A. Glendale Federal Bank, on Broward Blvd.
Q. How long have you worked there?
A. Seven years.
Q. And what are your duties there?
A. I am the head teller.
Q. What does that involve?
A. I run the daily operations
of the teller department, assist customers, and
research outages, basic supervisory duties.
Q. Who do you work most closely with?
A. Amy Peters and Nancy Taylor.
Q. And how long have you worked with
Amy for?
A. She's been there for about 5 years.
Q. What about Nancy Taylor?
A. She is the branch manager. She's
been there a few months. She came in April.
Q. And she was just there a short time
before the incident happened, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. As part of your training and
working for the bank, are you trained what to do if
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somebody comes to your teller window and demands money?
A. Yes, we are.
Q. And what is your training?
A. Normally they tell you to give them
whatever they ask for. If they tell you not to give
bait money, you don't give the bait money. If they
tell you not to pull the alarm, you don't do that.
Basically you give them what they want so they leave.
Q. Have you ever been robbed before?
A. Me, personally, no. But one of my
tellers has been robbed.
Q. Were you a witness to this?
A. Yes. They didn't catch them so it
didn't go any further than that.
Q. Were you able to give a description of
the person?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you give a description?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you feel the description was
accurate?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it the same bank that was robbed?
A. Yes.
Q. When was that?
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A. It was about two years ago.
Q. Was a note given in the other
incident?
A. No.
Q. I'd like to now discuss the particular
robbery in question. Do you recall what day of the
week it was?
A. It was a Friday.
Q. Do you recall what time the incident
took place?
A. Right when the doors opened at 9
o'clock.
Q. Tell me what happened.
A. Well, that day I was the only person at
the window because I had two tellers out sick. And
right when the doors opened, he entered the bank. I
looked at him and I recognized who he was.
Q. At this point, what were you doing?
A. I was counting my drawer.
Q. So you looked up?
A. Yes, I looked, and I saw him and waited
for him to come around.
Q. How long did you look at him when he
entered the bank?
A. Three seconds.
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Q. Did the man have a baseball cap and
sunglasses on?
A. Yes.
Q. And yet you recognized him when he came
through the door?
A. Yes.
Q. How?
A. Because I know who he is. He's kind of
a strange individual.
Q. In what way is he strange?
A. There is no one type of a mannerism
that I could pick out. But for instance, he had a lot
of money in this one account and he kept withdrawing
money out of the account and the service charge is ten
dollars a month. We told him to change it over to his
other account so he doesn't get the service charge but
he didn't want to do it. It's kind of strange that
somebody would want to pay ten dollars a month for no
reason.
Q. How did you recognize the perpetrator
as being Mr. Jones?
A. He's one of our customers.
Q. Well, the man that came through the
door had a cap and sunglasses on. How did you
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recognize him to be Mr. Jones? Does Mr. Jones always
wear a cap and sunglasses?
A. He doesn't always wear sunglasses. On
a few occasions he's worn a hat.
Q. What feature was it that led you to
believe it was Mr. Jones?
A. No particular feature, it's his general
appearance.
Q. So you are describing what got your
attention that it was Mr. Jones was his general
demeanor?
A. Yes.
Mrs. Waters: No further questions your Honor.
Judge: Mrs. Daley, would you like to question the
witness?
Mrs. Daley: Yes, thank you, your honor.
Cross-Examination of Dawn Mitchell
Q. Good afternoon, Dawn. I represent Mr.
Jones in this case and would like to ask you some
questions regarding the robbery at the bank in which
you work. Are you are currently working at the same
Glendale Federal Bank that was robbed?
A. Yes.
36
Q. Dawn, you were an eyewitness to the
robbery that occurred at Glendale Federal Bank, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any vision problems?
A. No, I don't.
Q. And you don't wear glasses?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Contacts?
A. No.
Q. When was the last time you had your
eyes checked?
A. About two months ago. I got something
in my eye and they checked it out but my vision was
perfect.
Q. How about your memory, your ability
to recall?
A. No problems.
Q. What happened next?
A. He came to my window.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He had a canvas bag that he sat on the
teller window. And he had a note underneath it and he
pushed it like this [hand gesture], with his hand on
the note. I was trying to look at the note because a
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lot of times customers write down how they want their
change but he grabbed it away pretty fast. The only
thing I saw was eight hundred written on the note.
[PAUSE]
He was soft-spoken and calm.
[PAUSE]
He told me to give him the money. He was sweating a
lot,
[PAUSE]
and he seemed nervous.
[PAUSE]
And at that point, I knew I was being robbed.
[PAUSE]
Q. Was the perpetrator wearing any jewelry?
For example, a watch?
A. No.
[PAUSE]
Q. How come you didn't mention that he
seemed nervous during any of your previous statements?
A. I remember he appeared nervous
[PAUSE]
Q. What happened next?
[PAUSE]
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Q. Didn't you previously state at the
crime scene that the perpetrator was calm throughout
the entire incident?
A. I remember he appeared nervous
Q. What happened next?
[PAUSE]
A. I went to my top drawer which only
contains twenties and less and he said, "no, I want
hundreds." I then went to my second drawer to get out
the hundreds. I broke out a strap of hundreds and I
gave it to him.
[PAUSE]
He said, "I have a gun I'll shoot you, give me more."
[PAUSE]
That's when I saw something sticking out from
underneath his shirt. So at that point I gave him the
rest of the money
[PAUSE]
he threw it into his bag
[PAUSE]
and he left.
Q. Did you notice Amy Peters around there
anywhere?
A. Yes. Apparently she was asking Nancy if
she knew the customer.
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Q. How long would you say it took the
whole thing to go down?
A. Three minutes.
Q. And how close did Amy get to him?
A. About seven feet.
Q. Was she in a position to ever see his
face?
A. Yes, when he walked through the door.
Q. Did you notice any distinguishing
features on his face, like birthmarks, scars, or moles?
A. No.
Q. Did he have a mustache?
A. No.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. Yes.
Q. What was his facial hair like?
A. He was clean shaven.
Q. What was he wearing?
A . He was wearing a baseball cap,
and sunglasses that were tinted brown, and he had on
jeans, and a jacket.
Q. What color was the jacket?
A. It was a dark colored jacket.
Q. Is that what he normally wears when he
comes into the bank?
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A. No. He normally wears scrub gear
that people wear for surgery.
Q. When you say scrub gear, you are
talking about the hospital type gear, is that right?
A. Yes.
[PAUSE]
Q. What was his demeanor like during the
robbery?
A. He appeared to be nervous.
Q. Just moments ago, you stated he was
soft-spoken and calm. Which is it? Was he nervous or
calm?
A. He appeared nervous
Q. Did he threaten you at any point?
A. No.
Q. Earlier in your testimony you stated
that he said he would shoot you if you didn't give him
more money.
A. He did not threaten me.
[PAUSE]
Q. Did he threaten you at any point?
A. No.
Q. In a previous deposition, you stated that
he threatened your life if you didn't give him the
money.
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A. He did not threaten me.
[PAUSE]
Q. Did he threaten you at any point?
A. No, he did not threaten me.
Q. How come you never mentioned this point
in any of your previous statements during the
investigation?
A. He did not threaten me.
[PAUSE]
Q. Did the police have you make an
identification?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did you make this identification?
A. Where Mr. Jones works.
Q. When you saw him at his place of work,
what was he wearing?
A. He had changed his clothes to a
white shirt and a pair of dark pants.
Q. You previously stated that the
perpetrator was wearing sunglasses that were tinted
brown. Were they the same sunglasses the police showed
you?
A. Yes, they looked the same.
Q. Would you say you got a good look at the
perpetrator?
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A. Yes.
Q. Could you see the color of his eyes?
A. No, not with his glasses on.
Q. What type of jacket did he have on?
A. It was a dark denim jacket with a
pocket on the inside. That's where he put the money.
[PAUSE]
Q. During the investigation you provided
numerous statements. You never mentioned that he put
the money in his jacket pocket before.
A. I remember he put the money inside his
jacket pocket.
[PAUSE]
Q. In a previous statement at the crime
scene, you stated that the perpetrator stuffed all the
money into a canvas bag.
A. He put the money inside his jacket
pocket.
[PAUSE]
Q. Earlier, you mentioned that he put all
the money in a canvas bag. Which is it?
A. He put the money inside his jacket
pocket.
[PAUSE]
Q. What type of hat did he have on?
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A. A baseball cap.
Q. What color was the baseball cap?
A. It was dark blue.
Q. Did it have anything on it?
A. There was something embroidered on the
front.
Q. When did you notice something was
embroidered on the front?
A. When he came up to my window.
[PAUSE]
Q. Did you notice any jewelry, watches?
A. Yes, he was wearing a gold chain.
Q. You stated earlier in your testimony
that the defendant was not wearing any jewelry, which
is it?
A. I remember he was wearing a chain.
[PAUSE]
Q. Did you notice any jewelry, watches?
A. Yes, he was wearing a gold chain.
Q. How come you never mentioned any
jewelry in previous depositions?
A. I remember he was wearing a chain.
[PAUSE]
Q. Did you notice any jewelry, watches?
A. Yes, he was wearing a gold chain
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Q. In a previous deposition you stated the
perpetrator was not wearing any jewelry, which is it?
A. I remember he was wearing a chain.
[PAUSE]
Q. When the police brought you to identify
Mr. Jones did he look exactly like the bank robber?
A. He changed his appearance a little bit
from what he looked like the morning of the robbery.
He was not wearing his hat. And of course he changed
his clothes.
Q. Now, Dawn, you are making a lot of
assumptions, aren't you?
A. In regard to what?
Q. That he changed his clothes. You don't
know he changed his clothes.
A. I know he changed from what
he was wearing when he came in to rob me.
Q. It might be that you are assuming that
Mr. Jones robbed you and it wasn't Mr. Jones?
A. No, because I recognized him when he
came in the door as being our customer, Mr. Jones.
Q. You are convinced that this was Mr.
Jones aren't you?
A. Yes, I am.
45
Q. And nothing is going to change you
mind?
A. No.
Q. What about the fact that you gave a
general description of the man that was standing in
front of you?
A. Because I recognized him when he came
in as being our customer, Mr. Jones.
Q. I don't mean to be rude but that's an
easy way out don't you think, "I recognized him when he
came in?"
A. No, because I know his face. I know
what he looks like.
Q. And you've never made a mistake about
identifying a person before?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Never seen two people that look alike?
A. Of course a lot of people look alike.
Q. Ever mistaken one person for another?
A. Yes, hasn't everyone?
Thank you your Honor I have no further questions
Direct Examination of Phil Watts (neutral defense witness)
Occupation: Manager of Milton Manor Apartments
Relationship to defendant (Mr. Jones): Mr. Jones' landlord
Questioning conducted by Mrs. Daley (defense attorney):
Q. Please state your name for the court.
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A. Phil Watts.
Q. Please state your occupation Mr. Watts.
A. I manage Milton Manor apartments in Fort
Lauderdale.
Q. Please state the full address.
A. 101 East Commercial Blvd.
Q. Do you know the defendant Mr. Jones?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your relationship with Mr. Jones?
A. I'm his landlord.
Q. How long has Mr. Jones been living at
Milton Manors?
A. About 2 years.
Q. When did you first meet the defendant Mr.
Jones?
A. When I rented him the apartment 2 years
ago.
Q. Has he ever caused any sort of
disturbance in the building?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Does he ever play loud music?
A. No.
Q. Does he get along with the other tenants?
A. Yes, as far as I know.
Q. Would you say that Mr. Jones is a good
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tenant?
A. Yes.
Q. Could you elaborate on what you believe
is a "good tenant?"
A. Mr. Jones is a quiet person. He has
never caused me or any of the other tenants problems.
Q. What about the rent? Does Mr. Jones
normally pay the rent on time?
A. Always.
Q. How much rent does Mr. Jones pay a month?
A. $600.00
Q. Did Mr. Jones ever need an extension?
A. No.
Q. So his finances, as far as you know, are
stable and sufficient enough to at least pay the
necessities like rent each month?
A. Yes.
Q. So what you are saying is Mr. Jones is an
ideal tenant?
A. Yes.
Q. No further questions Your Honor
Judge to Prosecutor: Mrs. Waters, do you have any questions
for Mr. Watts?
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Cross-Examination of Phil Watts (neutral defense witness)
Q. Yes, your honor. Did you know the
defendant before his residence in your building?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever had a lengthy conversation
with him?
A. No.
Q. So you don't know him on a social level?
A. No, not really.
Q. You would not be a good judge of his
character then?
A. I guess not.
Q. Mr. Watts, when Mr. Jones applied for
residency, did you ask for his place of employment?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you verify this?
A. No.
Q. So you do not know if he is or was ever
working there?
A. Not directly.
Q. Did you ever contact his required
references?
A. No.
Q. If you don't know about his history or
his present state of affairs, you cannot then compose
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opinions about Mr. Jones. How can you recognize this
man from any other residing in your building, let alone
from another perpetrator?
A. I know who he is.
No further questions your honor.
Judge: Mrs. Waters, do you have any further questions
for the witness?
Mrs. Waters: No further questions, your honor.
CLOSING STATEMENT FOR PROSECUTION
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, when I first stood
before you at the beginning of this trial, I told you what
we, the state, would prove. I told you that we had an
eyewitness who would testify to what she saw happen that
Friday at the Glendale Federal Bank. You even heard Mrs.
Mitchell get up on the stand and say that she knew it was
Mr. Jones because she had seen him before. She knew it was
him because "he was a regular customer of mine." Now, you
just heard the defense say that Mrs. Mitchell was mistaken,
of that she was lying. Ladies and gentlemen, I want you to
think to yourself what, if anything, does Mrs. Mitchell gain
from testifying here today? I am very confident that when
you review the evidence and weigh the facts in this case,
your decision will be a very easy one. And that decision is
a guilty verdict of armed robbery.
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CLOSING STATEMENT FOR DEFENSE
Mistaken identity. Ladies and gentlemen, at the
beginning of this trial you heard the phrase mistaken
identity. After listening to the witnesses and looking at
the evidence, it is time for you to make a decision.
However, before you decide the outcome of this case, I want
to remind you of your civil duty to the criminal justice
system. Let me point out some highlights of the evidence
exposed to you during the trial. I want you to remember
when Mrs. Mitchell got up on the stand. I want you also to
remember that you are to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Try and remember everything she said about what
the culprit was wearing and what he looked like. I want you
also to remember that the state must prove beyond and to the
exclusion of any reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones committed
this crime. Ladies and gentlemen, this is an extremely high
burden to meet. I am confident that you will return the
only verdict that speaks the truth, a verdict of not guilty.
JUDGES' INSTRUCTIONS
Members of the jury, I thank you for your attention
during this trial. Please pay attention to the instructions
I am about to give you.
STATEMENT OF CHARGE
Gary R. Jones, the defendant in this case, has been
accused of the crime of robbery.
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PLEA OF NOT GUILTY; REASONABLE DOUBT; AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This
means you must presume or believe the defendant is innocent.
The presumption stays with the defendant as to each material
allegation in the Information through each stage of the
trial until it has been overcome by the evidence to the
exclusion of and beyond a reasonable doubt.
To overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence
the State has the burden of proving the following two
elements:
1. The crime with which the defendant is charged
was committed.
2. The defendant is the person who committed the
crime. The defendant is not required to
prove anything. Whenever the words
"reasonable doubt" are used you must consider
the following: A reasonable doubt is not a
possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or
forced doubt. Such a doubt must not
influence you to return a verdict of not
guilty if you have an abiding conviction of
guilt. On the other hand, if, after
carefully considering, comparing and weighing
all the evidence, there is not an abiding
conviction of guilt, or, if, having a
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conviction, it is one which is not stable but
one which wavers and vacillates, then the
charge is not proved beyond every reasonable
doubt and you must find the defendant not
guilty because the doubt is reasonable.
It is to the evidence introduced upon this
trial, and to it alone, that you are to look
for that proof. A reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the defendant may arise from the
evidence, conflict int he evidence or the
lack of evidence.
If you have a reasonable doubt, you should find the
defendant not guilty. If you have no reasonable doubt, you
should find the defendant guilty.
WEIGHING THE EVIDENCE
It is up to you to decide what evidence is reliable.
You should use your common sense in deciding which is the
best evidence, and which evidence should not be relied upon
in considering your verdict. You may find some of the
evidence not reliable, or less reliable than other evidence.
You should consider how the witnesses acted, as well as
what they said. Some things you should consider are:
1. Did the witness seem to have an opportunity
to see and know the things about which the
witness testified?
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2. Did the witness seem to have an accurate
memory?
3. Was the witness honest and straightforward in
answering the attorneys' questions?
4. Did the witness have some interest in how the
case should be decided?
5. Does the witness; testimony agree with the
other testimony and other evidence in the
case?
6. Has the witness been offered or received any
money, preferred treatment or other benefit
in order to get the witness to testify?
7. Had any pressure or threat been used against
the witness that affected the truth of the
witness's testimony?
8. Did the witness at some other time make a
statement that is inconsistent with the
testimony he gave in court?
9. Was it proved that the witness had been
convicted of a crime?
10. Was it proved that the general reputation of
the witness for telling the truth and being
honest was bad?
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You may rely upon your own conclusion about the
witness. A juror may believe or disbelieve all or nay part
of the evidence or the testimony of any witness.
DEFENDANT NOT TESTIFYING
The constitution requires the State to prove its
accusations against the defendant. It is not necessary for
the defendant to disprove anything. Nor is the defendant
required to prove his innocence. It is up to the State to
prove the defendant's guilt by evidence.
The defendant exercised a fundamental right by choosing
not to be a witness in this case. You must not view this as
an admission of guilt or be influenced in any way by his
decision. No juror should ever be concerned that the
defendant did or did not take the witness stand to give
testimony in the case.
ROBBERY
Before you can find the defendant guilty of Robbery,
the State must prove the following four elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:
1. Gary R. Jones took the money or property
described in the charge from the person or
custody of Glendale Federal Bank.
2. Force, violence or assault, or putting in
fear was used in the course of the taking.
3. The property taken was of some value.
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4. The taking was with the intent to temporarily
or permanently deprive Glendale Federal Bank
of its right to the property or any benefit
from it.
"In the course of the taking" means that the act
occurred prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to
the taking of the property and that the act and the taking
of the property constitute continuous series of acts or
events.
In order for a taking of property to be robbery, it is
not necessary that the person robbed be the actual owner of
the property. It is sufficient if the victim has the
custody of the property at the time of the offense.
The taking must be by the use of force or violence or
by assault so as to overcome the resistance of the victim,
or by putting the victim in fear so that he does not resist.
The law does not require that the victim of robbery resist
to any particular extent or that he offer any actual
physical resistance if the circumstances are such that he is
placed in fear of death or great bodily harm if he does
resist. But unless prevented by fear there must be some
resistance to make the taking one done by force or violence.
It is also robbery if a person, with intent to take
property from a victim, administers any substance to another
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so that the victim becomes unconscious and then takes the
property from the person or custody of the victim.
In order for a taking by force, violence or putting in
fear to be robbery, it is not necessary that the taking be
from the person of the victim. It is sufficient if the
property taken is under the actual control of the victim so
that it cannot be taken without the use of force, violence
or intimidation directed against the victim.
SUBMITTING CASE TO JURY
In closing, let me remind you that it is important that
you follow the law spelled out in these instructions in
deciding your verdict. There are no other laws that apply
to this case. Even if you do not like the laws that must be
applied, you must use them. For two centuries we have
agreed to a constitution and to live by the law. No one of
us has the right to violate rules we all share.
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